

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.234  
16 September 1965  
ENGLISH

**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 16 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. P. LIND (Sweden)

DR. MORGENTHAU  
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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil: Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. D. SILVEIRÁ da MOTA

Bulgaria: Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma: U SAIN BWA  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada: Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia: Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia: Lij M. IMRU  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. T. BEKELE

India: Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE  
Mr. S.V. PURUSHOTTAM  
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy: Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. B. VEGESACK  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV  
Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV  
Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. A.A. SALAMI  
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. P.W.J. BUXTON  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the two hundred and thirty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

With the consent of the co-Chairmen, I propose that we deal first with the draft report (ENDC/156) and that after we have finished considering it I should call on the representatives who wish to make statements.

During consideration of the draft report at yesterday's meeting some drafting changes were suggested by the representative of India (ENDC/PV.233, pp.9 et seq.) and by the representative of Nigeria (ibid., p.11), speaking on behalf of the eight non-aligned delegations. The co-Chairmen kindly promised to consider those suggestions and to report to the Committee this morning. May I ask for such a report, please?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): On behalf of the two co-chairmen I wish to make the following statement,

At the request of several members of the Committee the co-Chairmen have discussed the wishes expressed yesterday in regard to amendments to the draft final report. The co-Chairmen propose that these wishes be dealt with as follows:

First, one of the suggestions expressed by the representative of India was that parts II and III of the draft report should be merged under one heading:

"General and Complete Disarmament and Measures Aimed at the Lessening of International Tension, the Consolidation of Confidence Among States, and Facilitating General and Complete Disarmament".

The co-Chairmen have agreed that such a merging would be useful. In accordance with Mr. Trivedi's suggestion, the first sentence of the second paragraph of page 2 of the English text will now read:

(continued in English):

"In its efforts to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date, the Committee continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed to prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament."

(continued in Russian):

Secondly, the other suggestion of the representative of India was that we should add a sentence at the end of the first paragraph, or change the last sentence of the third paragraph on page 2 of the English text, so as to reflect the fact that resolution DC/225 of the Disarmament Commission (ENDC/149) had recommended the re-convening of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and made certain specific suggestions regarding

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negotiations on general and complete disarmament and collateral measures. The co-Chairmen have come to the conclusion that at this stage it would be inappropriate to try to include the sentence suggested by the representative of India. Moreover, they believe that the chief purpose of the sentence suggested by India has already been achieved by the draft report in the form in which it is now worded.

Thirdly, the co-Chairmen have also carefully studied the proposal of the representative of Nigeria, made on behalf of the eight non-aligned countries members of the Committee, to add to the last sentence on page 1 of the English text a sentence reflecting the view of those members, as well as of certain other members of the Committee, that the Committee should reconvene preferably before the end of January 1966. The actual date "could be decided by the two co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee." (ENDC/PV.233, p.11) Although the co-Chairmen do not object in principle to the idea expressed in that suggestion, they have come to the conclusion that in the time remaining it would be impossible to try to include such a sentence in the report.

As was pointed out at our meeting yesterday, the co-Chairmen are fully agreed on the desirability of reconvening the Committee as soon as possible after consideration of the question of disarmament by the General Assembly. Moreover, they wish to assure the Committee that they will take fully into consideration the point of view expressed in the suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria when they hold consultations regarding the resumption of our work immediately after the question of disarmament has been considered by the General Assembly.

The co-Chairmen believe that the report in this amended form is satisfactory and hope that it will be supported by the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I thank the Soviet representative for his comments on the draft report on behalf of the two co-Chairmen. As we have heard, the two co-Chairmen recommend that the first amendment suggested by the representative of India should be accepted and that, consequently, the text as suggested by him should be included at the beginning of Part III of the present draft report.

As to the other suggestion made by the representative of India, the co-Chairmen report that they do not find it possible or useful to accept it.

With regard to the suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria on behalf of the eight non-aligned members of the Committee, the co-Chairmen report that they do not find it feasible to make the suggested amendment. However, they give the assurance

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that full account will be taken of the suggestion when they meet to decide a date for the resumption of our work after the termination of the discussion in the General Assembly.

Does any representative wish to comment on the co-Chairmen's report?

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): First I should like to express our thanks to our hard-working co-Chairmen for considering the amendment which I proposed yesterday on behalf of my other non-aligned colleagues and myself. At the same time I should like to express our disappointment that the two co-Chairmen have not found it possible to accept the amendment. We are, however, pleased that they have taken due note of the wishes of the non-aligned delegations on the question of reconvening the Conference and, while we regret, as we do deeply, that our amendment could not be incorporated in the draft report because of certain reasons, I should like to express the hope that in future the draft report may be submitted early so that amendments can be duly considered.

Secondly, I should like to say, as representative of Nigeria, that I personally regret that it was not possible for the co-Chairmen to accept the other amendment suggested by the representative of India. It was an amendment which I felt to be a very valuable one; and, although I listened very carefully to our Soviet co-Chairman, I must confess I found it very difficult to understand the reasons why we could not have that amendment incorporated-- even if, as he said, the point had been covered already. I should have been happier had it been incorporated; but I leave it to our Indian colleague to decide whether he wishes to press the matter, and I leave it to our co-Chairmen to decide whether they should accommodate us instead of-- as it now appears-- agreeing to disagree with all but one of the amendments that have been suggested so far.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): The Indian delegation is extremely grateful to the co-Chairmen for their consideration of the amendments suggested by us and by the representative of Nigeria on behalf of the non-aligned delegations. We are particularly grateful to the co-Chairmen for accepting one of the amendments suggested by us; and we also share the regret expressed by the representative of Nigeria that the other amendments were not accepted -- both those suggested by us and that suggested by the eight non-aligned delegations. Certainly we do not propose to press any amendment on the co-Chairmen. We have said that we have watched with great admiration the

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work that the co-Chairmen have put in, the initiative they have taken and the guidance they have given to this Committee throughout the session. I fail to understand, however, why the alternative suggested by me elaborating the sentence describing resolution DC/225 did not find favour with the co-Chairmen.

It is too late at the moment to engage in a debate on the issue and I do not want to press it, but I might suggest to the co-Chairmen as well as to members of the Committee that the present sentence is factually incorrect. When the co-Chairmen suggest in their draft that the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 made certain specific recommendations to the Committee, that is factually incomplete. It is not what the Disarmament Commission did. The Disarmament Commission resolution did make certain recommendations to the Committee, but it did other things as well. To describe in an incomplete manner a resolution of the Disarmament Commission representing 114 Members of the United Nations is not, to our mind, appropriate. I can understand the co-Chairmen not wanting any revision of their draft; but I should have thought that at least the description of the resolution would be given correctly and factually, and that at least they would say "which recommended the re-convening of the Committee and made certain recommendations", because that is what the Commission did.

Even if that is not acceptable at this stage, I might make other compromise suggestions. I do not want to take up very much of the Committee's time and, as I have said, I do not want to press anything -- even this -- ; but I should like to say that it appears to me, and I am sure it appears to all of us except perhaps the co-Chairmen. that that reference is factually incomplete. The Commission did things besides making recommendations to the Committee.

Finally, if the original suggestion is not acceptable, then I suggest at least the addition of the words "inter alia", so that the text could read: "which, inter alia, made certain specific recommendations to the Committee".

I should very much welcome the comments of the two co-Chairmen at this stage.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The representative of India has commented on the report of the two co-Chairmen and has made some suggestions, and he asks if it is possible to have some comments from the two co-Chairmen. May I ask whether either of the two co-Chairmen wishes to reply?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am happy to inform the Committee that both the co-Chairmen have found it possible to meet the wish of the representative of India, and they recommend the Committee to accept the amendment to insert the words "inter alia"; but may I ask whether the representative of India thinks that those words should come after the word "made" or the word "which"?

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): I should imagine after the word "which", so that the text would read "which, inter alia, made certain specific recommendations to the Committee".

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It is now clear that the co-Chairmen agree to the insertion of "inter alia" after the word "which", as suggested by the representative of India.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The co-Chairmen have agreed to the suggestion of the representative of India to insert the words "inter alia" after the word "which" in the penultimate line of the second paragraph of part III of the draft report.

I now propose that we proceed with the adoption of the report.

May I point out that in paragraph B of part I, on page 1, the number "Sixteen" should be changed to "Seventeen" owing to the extra meeting we had yesterday? Is there any objection to that change? I understand there is none.

Next, following upon the agreement by the two co-Chairmen to the suggestion made by the representative of India, parts II and III should be combined and the heading worded as follows:

"General and Complete Disarmament and Measures Aimed at the Lessening of International Tension, the Consolidation of Confidence Among States, and Facilitating General and Complete Disarmament"

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Accordingly, the first sentence of the present part III will read as follows:

"In its efforts to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date, the Committee continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed to prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament."

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May I take it that that amendment is agreed to? There being no objection, it is adopted.

From that amendment it follows that paragraphs will have to be re-numbered so that the present parts IV and V will become parts III and IV.

May I next draw the attention of the Committee to one addition which will have to be made on page 3 where the draft refers to the possibility of adding other documents? Instead of the words enclosed within square brackets at the middle of page 3, there should now be inserted the following:

"On 14 September 1965, at the 232nd meeting, Italy submitted a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration (ENDC/157).

"On 15 September 1965, at the 233rd meeting, a Joint Memorandum on non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/158\*), and a Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (ENDC/159\*), were submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic."

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): As regards the declaration submitted by the representative of Italy yesterday, probably it lacks the mention of "nuclear weapons". In any case, nuclear weapons should be mentioned, not acquisition in general of we know not what.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The text corresponds to the heading of document ENDC/157 submitted by Italy. I feel that it is hard to reproduce any other text in the report.

Mr. CAVALIETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Our title was probably not very precise, but since we had been talking so much about non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, clearly nothing else could have been meant. However, it is preferable to mention nuclear weapons in the report, as has just been suggested by the representative of Mexico.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The representative of Italy agrees to the insertion of the words "nuclear weapons" in the text of the report. The Secretariat points out that it would then be preferable or even necessary to change also the

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heading of the draft declaration. Unless, therefore, the representative of Italy is willing to change the heading both in the draft declaration and in the report, I think we should retain the existing wording.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): Permit me to disagree. I do not think it is essential for the representative of Italy to change the heading of his draft declaration. The report is the report of the working of the Committee, and in the Committee the representative of Italy submitted the draft declaration. He then made it very clear that it referred to nuclear weapons and, as far as India is concerned, we are not putting it in quotation marks. All we are saying is what was discussed in the Committee, and the report does not necessarily have to put in quotation marks the actual title of the draft declaration. The Committee discussed this issue. The representative of Italy did say in his statement that his draft declaration referred to nuclear weapons; and so I think the suggestion made by the representative of Mexico stands by itself, and for our part we think we should accept it. The other change is a different matter, and I would certainly join you, Mr. Chairman, and the Secretariat in asking the representative of Italy if he could consider it; but as far as the report is concerned I see no objection to or difficulty in accepting the suggestion made by the representative of Mexico.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I reflected for some time before giving a title to my declaration. It occurred to me, of course, that the title should reflect very clearly everything contained in the declaration itself. What has just been said by the representative of India is very true. I thought that my declaration would be considered in the context of the explanations I had given to the Committee. Although I thought at first that the suggestion by the representative of Mexico was a useful one, after consulting the representative of the Secretary-General I think that the text could be left as it stands.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The representative of Italy prefers to leave the text as it now stands. Is there any objection to that?

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): I am not actually in disagreement, for I do not see any objection to the report as it is; but I was wondering whether this reference to the joint memoranda submitted by the eight non-aligned delegations would not be better in a

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rather different form. We could have one paragraph ending with "(ENDC/158\*)" and then another paragraph dealing with the second joint memorandum submitted in document ENDC/159\*, so that they would be in different places. Although they were presented by our colleague from Mexico on the same day and in the same speech, they are completely different things, and I think we should like them separated. This is not a very serious point, and I am not pressing it, but I think the form would be better if what I have suggested were done.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The representative of Nigeria has suggested that the paragraph dealing with the joint memoranda submitted by the eight non-aligned delegations should be divided into two parts, mentioning one memorandum at a time. May I ask for the opinion of the Secretariat?

Mr. PROTITCH (Special Representative of the Secretary-General): It is of course for the Committee to decide, but I do not see any difference because both memoranda were submitted on 15 September. If it is thought desirable, the separation into two parts can be made. It is a suggestion emanating from the two co-Chairmen.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): There seems to be no objection on the part of the Secretariat. A suggestion has been made by the representative of Nigeria, and I think I am interpreting the feelings of the eight if I say that we should like to see this slight amendment accepted, if the co-Chairmen consent. Apparently the co-Chairmen agree; so, if there is no objection from any other representative, the paragraph dealing with the memoranda will be split into two sentences. We will then include a paragraph as suggested by the representative of Nigeria.

Are there any other comments on the draft report? If not, can I consider the report, with the amendments which have just been accepted, to be adopted?

The report was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I will now call on the first speaker on my list.

Mr. GOLDBLAT (Poland): We have reached a stage in the Committee's deliberations when comprehensive stocktaking of its labours is a matter of course. With your permission I shall depart from that otherwise useful practice and reduce my statement to a few observations.

We have certainly had a lively and at times a stimulating exchange of views. However, while analysing the speeches made here I could not help wondering at the amount of effort and ingenuity invested by some Western representatives in complicating relatively uncomplicated matters and in twisting their very essence.

Take the test-ban issue. The fundamental question, to test or not to test, has in fact been transformed into the question "to inspect or not to inspect?", as if intensive underground tests were conducted solely because of lack of adequate means for detecting and identifying seismic events. No one can force the nuclear Powers, or for that matter any other Powers, into signing an international treaty which would not be politically advantageous and serve their national interests. Therefore an agreement, freely entered into, to stop nuclear explosions would actually be self-enforceable; for it is inconceivable that anyone would risk the loss of sure political gains obtained owing to the treaty and resort to sneaky underground shots of doubtful military value. In all fairness, nobody here has suggested such an eventuality. However, some, while admitting the unlikelihood of secret testing, insist on providing deterrence even against the hypothetical contingency of cheating. Let me for the sake of argument follow their line of reasoning, however alien to sound political thinking it may be.

It is obvious that one cannot test nuclear weapons "under the jacket". The explosions set off underground propagate seismic disturbances far beyond the borders of the testing State. We have learnt from the representatives of the United States (ENDC/PV.229), the United Kingdom (ENDC/155; PV.231), Sweden (ENDC/154) and Canada (ENDC/PV.231) about the impressive achievements in the art of detecting, locating and identifying earth tremors. We have been informed also that even more significant results are expected from further research in the field. If that is so -- and there is no reason for us to question the veracity of those statements --, then, I submit, the steady and dynamic world-wide progress of geophysical sciences and the concomitant constant improvement of seismic monitoring capabilities will, by dint of their very

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unpredictability, discourage any prospective violator of a test-ban treaty. In any event such deterrence, if there really is need for it, is certainly more effective than on-site inspection involving haphazard hole-digging and wandering, as if on speleological expeditions, in mines or other subsurface cavities, as suggested by the West.

This brings me back to my original question: what in reality are we discussing here -- the cessation of tests or the establishment of inspection? The linking of the two reminds one of a misalliance; one can exist without the other. The Western Powers are primarily interested in inspection. The socialist countries for their part, as well as the non-aligned nations, are primarily interested in the cessation of tests. That is why we have been talking at cross-purposes.

A similar reluctance to call a spade a spade is evident in the approach by some Western representatives to the question of arresting the spread of nuclear weapons. Here again the central issue -- to spread or not to spread -- has been sidetracked by discourses about the security of NATO and by abstruse dissertations about the nature of military alliances.

Take the question of security. From time to time, for various reasons and purposes, a hue and cry is raised about the threat supposedly coming from the Warsaw Pact countries. This time that bugbear is needed to give a semblance of legitimacy to the West German claims for nuclear weapons. But the tired clichés about the communist menace can hardly deceive anyone.

Nobody questions the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany, while our borders are being openly challenged by the highest State officials in West Germany. It is not Poland or any other socialist State which rejects and obstructs the implementation of initiatives aimed at the relaxation of international tension and disarmament. It is precisely the Federal Republic which has been adamantly opposed to any such initiatives -- and not only to those which have originated in the socialist countries. It is not Poland, or Czechoslovakia, or the German Democratic Republic which puts forward claims for nuclear weapons. It is precisely the Federal Republic which seeks to obtain control over those weapons and launches strategic concepts corresponding to those aspirations. It is from there that the icy blast of the cold war has been blowing for years.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

These words may sound harsh compared to the eulogy, bordering on an encomium, of West German policies which we had the displeasure of hearing a few days ago. But, truth being truth, I would rather tell it and shame the devil -- if my British friends will allow me to paraphrase slightly the Shakespearean words.

The nations of Europe have a vivid memory of the experiences of the last decades. They are determined to prevent a repetition of the tragedy which plunged our continent into the sea of despair. We can pay our debt to the past by putting the future in debt to ourselves.

Now, to consider the sharing of nuclear weapons with the Federal Republic as indispensable for the security of West Germany or any other NATO member is like looking at the world through a distorting mirror. In point of fact the dilemma, to share or not to share, implies a choice between dissemination and non-dissemination; between a continued armaments race and the limitation of armaments; between European security and European insecurity.

It goes without saying that any disarmament treaty is meant to impose restrictions of a quantitative or qualitative nature. A ban on the spread of nuclear weapons is naturally incompatible with the freedom to disseminate. But apparently this truth is not recognized by everybody; for we have been told by some Western representatives that a non-dissemination treaty should permit changes in the existing structure of nuclear arrangements within NATO. In the view of those representatives, then, armament measures should take precedence over disarmament measures and determine the content of any disarmament agreement.

The representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Imru, rightly complained on 2 September last that --

"Governments continue to seek means of ensuring their security in individual or joint armaments programmes, rather than in disarmament measures" --

and insisted that --

"The Eighteen-Nation Committee ... must reverse this process ..." (ENDC/PV.229, p.11)

Regrettably enough his wise advice has not as yet been followed by the Western Powers.

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The way in which the military alliances are organized is, I submit, entirely irrelevant to the problem we are discussing. In any event, there is nothing sacrosanct about them. If we ever reach a point in our discussions when the existence of those alliances will stand in the way of progress, we should rather forgo the alliances, I suggest, than give up disarmament.

We realize that at this late hour no amount of arguing would bring about a change of heart on the part of our Western colleagues. If we have nevertheless ventured to tax the Committee's time and patience, we have done so only in an attempt to straighten out some misconceptions which have crept into our debate. And by dotting the i's and crossing the t's we have tried to bring our discussion back to the course from which it has veered. The memoranda (ENDC/158, 159) presented yesterday by the eight non-aligned nations constitute a useful and constructive contribution in this respect.

The forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly will, I am sure, provide ample opportunity to continue the exchange of views on those subjects as well as on others. May I express the ardent wish of my delegation that it may provide more solid ground for the further work of our Committee?

I avail myself of this opportunity to thank my colleagues sincerely for their generous indulgence, as well as to express gratitude to the representative of the Secretary-General and his staff for the valuable services rendered to us.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): As we come to the conclusion of our current session I should like to make one or two remarks.

As other speakers before me have done, I should like to welcome the two useful and constructive papers which were tabled here yesterday by the eight non-aligned delegations. We all appreciate that those delegations are to a degree the arbiters in our discussions. The consensus of their views on two major subjects which has been set out so clearly in documents ENDC/158\* and ENDC/159\* is an important contribution, isolating issues to be resolved and setting up guide posts. Those papers will form an important part of our report (ENDC/160) to the General Assembly, and our report in turn will provide the basis for the Assembly's discussion on disarmament at its twentieth session. It would not be appropriate for me at this time to make detailed comments on the two documents, but I can say that there is a great deal in them with which the Canadian delegation does agree.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In the Joint Memorandum on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons we have noted the statement that the non-aligned delegations present here --

"... are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should ... be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery." (ENDC/158\*)

That approach to the problem corresponds to that advocated by the Canadian Government and is one which commands wide support throughout the world. It provides a clear indication of the direction in which our efforts must be pursued.

The Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty shows us that, despite the recent improvement in the techniques of detecting and identifying underground tests which has been noted, the eight non-aligned delegations are aware that the problem has not yet been solved completely and --

"They still believe that agreement on a treaty banning underground tests could be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the Nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques ..." (ENDC/159\*, p.2)

During the current session useful suggestions have been made by the Swedish and other delegations on how we might go about bridging the small but critical gap which still separates us in this field. It is our hope that in the course of the next few months, even though the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be in recess, further progress will be made in developing those constructive proposals. As I indicated earlier, Canada is willing to consider carefully and sympathetically any programme which might be suggested.

I should not wish to follow my Polish colleague in polemics on those two suggestions, mainly because I feel that the answers to the assertions and allegations which he has made have already been given many times in the course of our previous negotiations, and I shall not take up the time of the Committee in repeating the refutations.

I should like also to refer briefly to the interesting initiative taken by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, at our 232nd meeting in introducing the draft of a Unilateral Non-Acquisition Declaration (ENDC/157). The Canadian

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delegation feels that that proposal merits careful study by all of us as an interim approach towards the permanent solution of the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Turning now to our report to the General Assembly, the Canadian delegation is gratified that, through the co-operation and understanding of all concerned, we have been able to reach agreement on a text. Like many other delegations here, we should have preferred the report to include a target date for reconvening the Committee. That would have demonstrated to the world that we take our grave responsibility here most seriously and desire to press on with negotiations. It would also have been of great practical assistance to smaller countries represented here in planning for the future staffing of their delegations. In spite of that, however, we realize that we must have the unanimous support of all delegations on a matter of this nature; and therefore we have naturally accepted the final recommendations made to us by our co-Chairmen. As long as we are all agreed that our work here must be resumed as soon as possible, there should be no difficulty in setting an appropriate date for reconvening the Committee when the co-Chairmen come to discuss the question at the end of the disarmament debate in the First Committee.

Speaking in general terms, it is the view of the Canadian delegation that the brief session which we are now concluding has been a fruitful one. We have managed to focus our attention primarily on a limited number of specific topics for which early solutions are clearly essential. We have clarified our respective points of view, and I think we have to some degree narrowed the differences which separate us. In the past few weeks delegations have demonstrated a constructive and conscientious approach.

In conclusion I should like, on behalf of the Canadian delegation, to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Dr. Protitch, the interpreters, translators and secretaries, and all the staff of the Secretariat, for the excellent services which they have once again provided for us. I think we are all conscious of how greatly the smooth and efficient operation of this Conference is due to their efforts, and we thank them sincerely for their contribution.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Our Committee is concluding another stage in its negotiations. The results of this last stage are not at all encouraging. The Committee began its work and the consideration of the questions on its agenda in the conditions of a tense and dangerous situation in the world. Recently, in several areas of the world, international tension has developed into open armed conflict. The greatest danger to the cause of peace continues to be the expanding aggression of the United States in Vietnam, where, according to the latest United States data, about 125,000 United States troops have been transferred and where open aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is continuing. A serious situation exists also in other areas of the world.

It is therefore all the more important, in our opinion, to redouble our efforts towards solving specific problems of disarmament and adopting effective measures to reduce international tension so as to create a basis for the solution of all international problems by peaceful means and without recourse to force. In these circumstances all the more disappointment and concern is caused by the fact that the Committee has once again been unable to do anything towards achieving that aim.

In the report to be submitted by the Committee to the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly it is stated that --

"... the members of the Committee believe that the extensive discussions on major problems relating to certain collateral measures were particularly valuable in clarifying the respective points of view of member governments." (ENDC/160, p.4)

In our view, however, it is hardly possible to be satisfied with the conclusion that, although our negotiations failed to lead to any agreement, they nevertheless enabled us to have a useful exchange of views. During our work many delegations rightly pointed out that the Committee had not unlimited time at its disposal and that time was working against us. A quick look at the development of events during the four years the Committee has been in existence fully confirms that fact. During these years of fruitless discussions in the Committee the arms race has continued and has led to the accumulation of further stocks of the most dangerous destructive weapons. The world situation has continued to deteriorate. The events in South-East Asia constitute only one confirmation, though an extremely weighty one, of that fact.

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The Committee will be able to fulfil its tasks only if the necessary preconditions for this purpose are brought about. That depends entirely on the positions taken by the Governments represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Only if the Governments of all member States are guided by the desire to solve specific problems and to adopt really effective measures to improve the situation in the world will it be possible for our work in the Committee to yield positive results.

In our opinion, therefore, it is important to have a proper approach not only to the solution of specific problems as regards the substance, but also to the selection of questions which in the present situation are the most urgent and important from the point of view of improving it and eliminating the most dangerous hot-beds of tension.

In this connexion it is impossible to pass over in silence the fact that the delegations of the Western Powers have adopted a negative position in regard to the discussion of such urgent and important measures as the liquidation of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of other States, and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The discussion and speedy solution of these questions have been urged by the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic together with the delegations of the other socialist countries.

However, the stress laid by the socialist countries, especially at the present time, on the adoption of those measures does not mean that we underestimate the importance of other steps or that we are avoiding discussion of them. In our statements we have also devoted considerable attention to other problems, in particular to measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. In my statement today I should like to make a few more comments in connexion with those questions.

In regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, the Czechoslovak delegation continues to maintain a perfectly clear position. We consider that it is important to achieve the earliest possible agreement on that question, which in our opinion could be satisfactorily resolved on the

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basis of conditions similar to those laid down in the Moscow Treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in three environments (ENDC/100/Rev.1). We therefore appreciate the flexibility of the position of the Soviet Government, which has again shown that it is fully prepared to resolve this question by means of a reasonable compromise on the basis of the proposal of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.224, pp. 9, 10) to extend the scope of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and for the nuclear Powers to declare a moratorium on other underground explosions until such time as a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear tests has been concluded.

We consider that this proposal of the United Arab Republic provides further evidence of the desire of the non-aligned countries to contribute their share in solving this important and urgent question. This lead-giving proposal is in no way diminished in value by the fact that the United States delegation, without even studying it, immediately rejected it (ENDC/PV.230, p.18; PV.231, p. 38) as an unacceptable basis for further negotiation as soon as the Soviet delegation expressed its approval of the proposal (ENDC/PV.230, p.9).

In our opinion this proposal reflects the sincere desire of the delegation of the United Arab Republic to facilitate the creation of an acceptable basis for the solution of the problem of underground nuclear tests. But does the immediate reaction of the United States delegation really mean that the United States has said its last word on this subject? I venture to express the hope that the United States will reconsider the proposal of the United Arab Republic and will adopt such a position in regard to it as will allow agreement to be reached on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests on a mutually-acceptable basis.

The desire of the non-aligned States to facilitate the achievement of agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests has been reaffirmed in the memorandum (ENDC/159\*) which was submitted by the delegations at yesterday's meeting and in which stress is again laid on the need to extend the scope of the Moscow partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests.

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The Czechoslovak delegation maintains a very definite position also in regard to the adoption of measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. In our opinion this is a serious problem calling for the speediest possible solution which would not leave any possibility for the direct or indirect dissemination of nuclear weapons. That position is also reflected in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/158)\* submitted at yesterday's meeting. That memorandum, which expresses the basic approach of the non-aligned countries to the question of a treaty on non-dissemination, contains some ideas which will have to be taken into account in the course of further negotiations on this question.

In our opinion an agreement on non-dissemination should not leave any possibility of circumventing the relevant measures, not only in respect of the transfer of nuclear weapons to other States so as to come under independent national control and be at their disposal, but also in respect of the possibility of circumventing the agreement by means of military groupings, which could be effected under the name of nuclear sharing, participation and partnership or under any other designation, in the form of a multilateral nuclear force, an Atlantic nuclear force or any other means which would give non-nuclear Powers the possibility of participating in the ownership, control and disposal of nuclear weapons, including the preparation of plans envisaging the use of nuclear weapons and the implementation of such plans.

In contrast to this, it is evident from all the statements of the Western delegations on the question of non-dissemination, as well as from the United States draft treaty (ENDC/152), that their aim is not to adopt effective and consistent measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons but, on the contrary, to create such conditions as would allow a further spread of these weapons within NATO and, in particular, to give access to these weapons to the aggressive imperialist circles in the Federal Republic of Germany.

That fact was further confirmed in the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, at the 231st meeting. The gist of his argument in that statement consisted in the assertion that, in order to avert the desire of certain States members of NATO, and first and foremost the Federal Republic of Germany, to acquire their own nuclear weapons, those States must be given a full voice in NATO policies and strategy, which would practically put them on the same footing as that of an independent possessor

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of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom representative thereby showed that he actually shares the point of view of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Schroeder, as expressed by the latter in a statement published in July this year in the West German newspaper Dusseldorfer Nachrichten, which has already been quoted by some delegations in this Committee. It is evident from that statement by Mr. Schroeder that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, in striving to obtain access to nuclear weapons, considers the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force in which the Federal Republic of Germany would participate to be equivalent to its possessing its own nuclear weapons. That is why the Czechoslovak Soviet Socialist Republic consistently maintains the view that the creation of a multilateral nuclear force or any other plan to integrate nuclear weapons within NATO, no matter under what name, is incompatible with measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Lord Chalfont and other representatives of NATO countries have levelled in their statements the reproach against the delegations of the socialist countries that their position on the question of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is contrary to the strategic plans and concepts of NATO. We gather from the words of the United Kingdom representative that the purpose of these strategic concepts is to do away with the present situation whereby some States members of NATO possess nuclear weapons while others do not.

The Czechoslovak delegation does not intend to use the discussions in this Committee as a means of interfering in the strategic plans of NATO. Since, however, the Committee is discussing the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we consider that the purpose of an agreement on this question is to prevent both individual States and military groupings from preparing and carrying out strategic plans providing for the spread of nuclear weapons to other States which so far do not possess them.

The point of view of the United Kingdom delegation and of the delegations of other NATO countries throws a strange light on the Committee. Perhaps they believe that the Committee should consider only such measures as are in accordance with the strategic concepts of NATO. But our Committee is a Disarmament Committee. It can hardly be expected

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that the measures which are to be agreed in the Committee will be in accordance with the strategic concepts of NATO, the basis of which is continuation of the arms race. This applies not only to the question of measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, but also to other problems.

In regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the solution of that problem depends entirely on the Western countries. If they are really interested in solving that problem, they will have to adopt a consistent position. Measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons should cover all States and should not give any privileges to States members of NATO. The obstacle hindering the achievement of agreement on measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons is the reluctance of the Western Powers to accept that basic principle, and not at all the position of principle of the socialist countries, which demand that measures to prevent dissemination should be consistent and should not allow any exceptions or provide any opportunity for the dissemination of nuclear weapons within NATO.

Those are the few comments which I wished to make on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation in connexion with the adjournment of the Committee's work, and which show once again that, as a result of the actions of the Western Powers, the Committee has failed also at this stage to achieve any further progress in its work. The reason for this is the obstinate position of the Western delegations on certain questions on the agenda of our Committee, as well as the general policy of the Western countries outside the Committee, which has led to a considerable heightening of international tension, as a result of which new obstacles have arisen in the path towards the achievement of an agreement on disarmament and on collateral measures to reduce international tension. It depends on the Governments of the Western Powers to change the course of their policy and thus bring about the prerequisites to enable the work of the Committee to yield at last positive results, the achievement of which at the present time is even more necessary than ever before.

In conclusion, I should like to associate myself with the remarks made by the representatives of Poland and Canada who spoke before me, and to express our gratitude to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and to the Secretariat of the Committee for their work, which has helped to bring about favourable conditions for our negotiations.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I had not intended to address the Committee this morning, but I should not like it to be thought that the United Kingdom delegation, at any rate, regards the contributions of the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia as being in any way a definitive analysis of the problems that face us. I have asked for the right to reply because in both speeches words of mine -- or curious distortions and interpretations of words of mine -- have been put forward in the arguments.

First of all, let me say that I resent strongly the attempts of the representative of Czechoslovakia to, as he put it, "boil down"<sup>1/</sup> my arguments and to present them in a form more suitable to his own arguments. I am perfectly capable of presenting my own arguments to this Committee, and I hope that, if people wish to know what I said on the subject of alliances or on the subject of non-proliferation, they will read the account of my speeches to get their information and not the account of the speech of the representative of Czechoslovakia. I did not refer at any time to liquidating the present state of affairs. I did not indicate my agreement with any other statesman, West German or otherwise; and, as I say, I resent this attempt on the part of the Czechoslovak representative to distort the meaning of what I said in this way.

I am particularly depressed that what had turned into what seemed to me to be a useful and valuable exchange of information in this Committee seems now to have deteriorated once more into an exchange of what I can only call simple-minded polemics.

The representative of Poland seemed to me to be grossly and wilfully oversimplifying all the issues that face us here. He talked of calling a spade a spade. Well, it may be a useful intellectual approach in an ironmonger's shop; but here we are dealing with sophisticated and delicate problems and the fears and concerns of people all over the world. This sort of semantic over-simplification really will not do in a committee of this kind. Apart from this curious over-simplification, we had once again, rearing its ugly head in front of us, this curious position of moral asymmetry that some of the representatives of the communist countries seem to find so attractive; and they turn to the tedious proposition that one side is always right and the other side is always wrong.

This just is not so. All sides in this terribly serious, vital argument are capable of misconceptions, capable of mistakes, and capable of misjudgements. We must examine these things closely, patiently and in detail. We must not be led into this

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foolish habit of over-simplifying the issues in this way. It is no good saying, as the representative of Poland said, that the West is concerned with the deterrence of hypothetical testing; it is no good saying that there is no communist menace, as though all these things were figments of the disordered imagination of the Western delegations, and then to go on talking about the threats of West German revanchism as though these were simple self-evident facts which are just simply incapable of being refuted. There are fears -- real fears -- on both sides of this argument. These are the things we have to deal with. These are not simple matters of fact, of military or technical fact. These are matters of the fears and concerns of people on both sides of this argument, and we must take them very clearly into account.

I am not going to deal in any detail with the specific remarks on either the question of the extended test ban or on the spread of nuclear weapons made by either of my two colleagues who have spoken this morning. To do so would be to follow them along what I regard as a profitless and useless polemical path. I should, however, like to refer to one matter in connexion with an extended test ban and the constant reference that was made to the memorandum -- the very useful memorandum -- put forward by the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/159\*).

Since we are referring to that memorandum, may I remind those who have referred to it that it also contains a passage alluding to the importance of the exchange of technical information? This is what the West wants. The West does not want inspection for the sake of inspection. If it can be demonstrated that a test ban can be put into practice effectively without inspections, then the West will be ready to consider that. But in order to make that political decision which people are always talking about, we need information. We have asked the Soviet Union for it. That request has been supported in the memorandum of the eight, and I would ask my colleagues of the communist delegations, if they wish to make quotations and to refer to this matter, not to do so selectively but to refer to it all.

May I, on a more pleasant note, echo the remarks made by my colleagues earlier by saying how much I appreciate the courtesy of all my colleagues in this, my first, session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament? I should like to pay tribute to the tireless patience of the co-Chairmen and to the efficiency of the Secretariat.

One of the earlier speakers this morning referred to the proceedings of this summer as being fruitless. I am sorry -- genuinely sorry -- if any representative here thinks that what we have been doing for the past eight weeks has been fruitless. For myself, I believe we have had an extremely interesting exchange of views, we have

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cleared up a number of misconceptions, and I hope we shall be able to go forward when we return here -- which I hope will be soon -- and examine some of the obstacles that we have now isolated as lying between us and agreement.

I believe that this epithet of "fruitless" will be justified only if we try to over-simplify the issues facing us. They are complicated and they are delicate. We must not try to over-simplify them into issues of right and wrong. We must really not perpetuate this ludicrous picture of "peace-loving communist States" and the "warmongering West". We are all presumably in search of the same aim. None of us here yet knows how to achieve it. We shall achieve it only if we respect each other's views, examine each other's arguments, and realize that we are here to try to end the outworn and unintelligent assumptions of the cold war, not to perpetuate them just for the sake of making debating points.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):  
Today the Committee is concluding its work, and it is not the first time, alas, that it has done so without having achieved anything, without having reached agreement on a single one of the questions on its agenda.

In today's report of the Committee to the General Assembly, just as in last year's report, it is stated:

"The Committee did not reach any specific agreement at this session either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension! (ENDC/160, p.4)

Thus the present session of the Committee has turned out to be just as fruitless -- and I am not afraid of being accused by Lord Chalfont of over-simplifying the situation -- as its previous session.

The accumulation of such negative experience in the disarmament negotiations is by no means a matter of chance. Whereas by January 1964 there had come about a favourable climate for the development of successful negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it was also round about that time that the downward curve began. The forces in favour of pursuing an imperialist policy, the forces opposing disarmament, after some confusion caused by the aforesaid favourable climate, re-formed their ranks and again moved into the attack.

The United States and other imperialist Powers carried out armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo, which was accompanied by the savage massacre of many thousands of Congolese. The United States began to intensify its armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people and to build up its armed forces in

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South Vietnam and nearby places. From lightly-camouflaged intervention in the affairs of Vietnam the United States turned to direct aggression, to open military operations against that Asian country. The United States has flung its land, sea and air forces against the Vietnamese people in the south of the country. Since February this year the United States, flouting the universally-accepted standards of international law, has violated the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the intangibility of the air-space of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and has engaged in barbaric bombings of that independent Asian State.

The United States has announced its intention to increase its military attacks on Vietnam. It calls this escalation. The United States occupation forces in that small Asian country now number almost 150,000 men, and quite recently, only a month and a half ago, when we resumed our work here in the Committee, there were half as many United States troops in Vietnam. The very fact of the escalation of United States military efforts in Vietnam shows how difficult it is, even for imperialists armed to the teeth, to fight a people engaged in a struggle for national liberation.

Then the United States embarked on an imperialistic military adventure in the Dominican Republic. Trampling on the sovereign rights of that tiny Latin-American Republic, the United States landed there tens of thousands of marines and paratroops. And all this is being done so that the United States can have in that country puppet governments obedient to its will.

What is going on in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic is imperialist despotism and violence against small unprotected peoples in the most blatant form.

The position of the Western Powers in the Committee is also clearly negative. They do not accept the proposal to eliminate foreign military bases and to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of other countries, and by so doing they emphasize that their foreign policy is aimed, not at lessening international tension, but at waging aggressive wars of conquest on other continents, using their foreign military bases as springboards for their military adventures.

The United States has also rejected another proposal to ban the use of nuclear weapons (A/5827 and Corr.1) which clearly shows that it wants to keep for itself freedom of action as regards the use of those weapons. Thus the United States has again demonstrated its disregard for the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which quite definitely stated that an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be achieved immediately (A/RES/1909 (XVIII)). It is characteristic that

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on the part of the United States there followed no reaction, other than a hasty negative reply (ENDC/PV.230, p.18), to the proposal of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.224, pp.9,10) for an immediate solution to the question of putting a stop to underground nuclear tests. That position of the United States shows that the United States intends to continue improving nuclear weapons and to continue testing those weapons underground.

Permit me to dwell on yet another fact characterizing the policy of the United States. I am referring to the well-known question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard the United States continues to cling to its untenable position of splitting this question into two parts. It proposes that non-nuclear States should be prohibited from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons as their own property or as coming under national control. Yet the United States does not want to prohibit the access of non-nuclear States to nuclear weapons through military alliances. That means that the West German revenge-seekers and militarists, who are so zealously striving to get their hands on nuclear weapons would be able to gain access to them through a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force or through an Atlantic nuclear force and such like.

Although NATO is an organization, as is quite evident from its name, we all realize that that organization is a military alliance of the States of the Western bloc. That alliance includes both nuclear and non-nuclear States. It is obvious that the formation of a NATO nuclear force would create a new situation also within that military alliance itself, since the non-nuclear States members of NATO, including West Germany, would be admitted to the NATO nuclear force. By acting in such a way the United States and those of its allies who support the proposal to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force and such-like are in flagrant contradiction with the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. That is why we reject as contradictory to the substance of the matter the remark which the representatives of the United States (ENDC/PV.232, pp.18 et seq) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.231, p.10) recently made in the Committee, following cries of anger from Bonn, that the Western Powers do not intend to make the question of the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force a subject of discussion in the Committee.

Such a position on the part of the Western Powers is absolutely untenable. If the Western Powers seriously want to achieve agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they must put an end to the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral

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nuclear force and to similar plans. But if the Western Powers intend to go on with their plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force and such-like, which, as we have already pointed out many times, is incompatible with the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, then we have no common basis for agreement on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have already pointed out that the draft treaty submitted by the United States (ENDC/152) is in fact aimed, not at preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, but at legalizing by a devious contrivance the dissemination of nuclear weapons through the creation of a new NATO nuclear force in which non-nuclear States would participate. That position of the United States is blocking the solution of this urgent question.

If we compare past and present facts of international life and the foreign policy of the United States with the position of the United States on questions of disarmament, we see that there is a deep-seated organic link, a close interdependence between them. The trend of the foreign policy of the United States and other Western Powers towards armed intervention in the internal affairs of other States leads to wars, to an intensification of the arms race, to a worsening of the international situation, and to stagnation in the negotiations on disarmament. The one is linked with the other, the one gives rise to the other. There can be no success in the disarmament negotiations as long as the United States and its NATO allies have such a policy.

The policy of imperialist adventures, aggression and the mailed fist is not compatible with disarmament. The one excludes the other. Only a radical change in the policy of the Western Powers in the direction of peaceful coexistence, only their renunciation of the policy of imperialist aggression, the policy of "from a position of strength", the policy of armed intervention in the internal affairs of other States, -- only that can ensure steady progress in the cause of disarmament. Unless there is such a change in the policy of the United States and, of course, of its NATO allies, any agreement, any partial agreement or agreements would be of an episodic nature, would not reflect the real trend in the development of international relations, and would inevitably lose their sense and meaning, as has been shown by the experience we have already had on that score in respect of a number of such questions.

It is characteristic that the proposals submitted by the United States and its Western Allies during the disarmament negotiations have not gone beyond particular measures which by themselves do not affect the existing material basis for waging a nuclear missile war. Under cover of flimsy arguments about the alleged need to maintain

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the existing balance of armaments, the United States and its NATO allies put forward and go on putting forward only such proposals as are not aimed at eliminating the existing stockpiles in stores and arsenals of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and the means of delivering those weapons of mass destruction. Yet only measures aimed at doing this could yield tangible results from the point of view of removing or at least significantly reducing the threat of a thermo-nuclear war which is hanging over mankind.

On the other hand, on that same flimsy pretext the United States has systematically rejected all the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as those of the non-aligned countries, aimed at really reducing the danger of a thermonuclear war, stopping the arms race, and lessening tension in international relations. In general, as can be seen quite clearly, the United States wants to go on sitting in the Committee but not to reach agreement on disarmament measures. The fact that the United States is not contemplating disarmament is also shown by a statement made quite recently by the United States representative, Mr. Foster. Speaking at the meeting of 31 August in defence of the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, Mr. Foster had a good deal to say to the effect that the Western Powers, in preparing that draft treaty, had tried to take into account in every way the possibilities of an eventual political evolution and union in Western Europe. The United States representative said, among other things:

"We would not want to preclude for all time any new collective political and defence entity which might, with great effort and patience, be created over an extended period in Western Europe. We would not want to preclude such an entity from possessing and controlling nuclear weapons if it should in fact develop the capability to assume the nuclear defence responsibilities of its formerly separate national components some of which are now nuclear Powers." (ENDC/PV.228, p.39).

From this statement of the United States representative it is obvious that the Western Powers are now concerned, not with nuclear disarmament, but with how to secure for the future by means of a treaty at the present time the right of access to nuclear weapons of any Western European alliance -- here again, of course, including West Germany. This programme for the nuclear arming of Western Europe or, more correctly, a future political entity in Western Europe which might only be created, as Mr. Foster himself says, over an "extended" period, shows that the United States in reality is preparing to continue the arms race for an extended period. In general, disarmament does not enter into the United States calculations. This is clearly evident from those plans.

I shall give yet another example. Speaking on 6 June at George Washington University the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, stated:

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"We must recognize that, even with reliable control and inspection, there are limits beyond which it could be unwise to go in disarming before the critical issues which divide the communist and the free worlds are settled -- such dangerous situations as the division of Berlin and Germany".

That is certainly an extremely frank description of the political line of the United States. But let us analyse Mr. Rusk's statement. It expounds one concept and two thoughts. The first thought is the recognition that between the United States and the other Western Powers on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on the other, there are some unsettled issues. The other thought is that it would be unwise really to disarm so long as those issues exist. Lastly, clearly defined in Mr. Rusk's statement is his concept that the West needs armaments as a factor of policy, as a means, as a tool or instrument with the help of which the Western Powers intend to accomplish the task of settling the critical issues, as Mr. Rusk called them. It is impossible to draw any other conclusion from Mr. Rusk's statement.

So now everything is clear. Mr. Rusk throws aside the obligations contained in the Charter which require that all Members of the United Nations shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means and that in all circumstances they shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and so forth. Mr. Rusk clearly implied that the United States and its allies set their hopes on armaments and on armed intervention in order to achieve their political aims and ambitions. That is precisely the policy which the United States is now putting into practice in Vietnam and in other areas of the world. It is anxious to keep armaments and armed forces at its disposal as a means of ensuring the implementation of that aggressive policy. That is the true position and the real policy of the United States. How greatly it differs from the pious statements made by the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee, who assure everybody of their ardent desire to disarm, of their serious intentions and so forth!

Everyone agrees that in these days the greatest danger to mankind is the threat of the outbreak of a devastating thermo-nuclear war. Everyone agrees that the main task is to prevent the possibility of the outbreak of such a war. Further, everyone agrees that the direct threat of a nuclear war lies in the possession by the nuclear Powers of huge stockpiles of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In other words, this threat lies in the very fact of the existence of the physical possibilities, the existence of the material means of waging a thermonuclear war. Consequently the solution to the problem of eliminating the threat of a thermo-nuclear war is to eliminate the physical possibilities and to destroy the material means of waging a thermo-nuclear war. Consequently, it is essential to destroy nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, or to begin with the

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retained by the Soviet Union and the United States of America until the end of the third stage of disarmament. Everyone is well acquainted with that Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

At the very beginning of the negotiations the Soviet Union put forward a concrete programme of constructive and realistic measures aimed at solving the most important problems before the Committee. We urged, and we still urge, that the key problems of general and complete disarmament should be solved so as to eliminate as soon as possible the danger of a devastating thermo-nuclear war. We continue to believe that general and complete disarmament is the shortest, the most direct and the most effective way towards a durable peace, the highway leading to the peaceful development and well-being of all peoples. That is why from the very beginning we have proposed solving the problem of general and complete disarmament by large-scale measures, by effective steps, such as are imperatively demanded by the requirements of general security today.

Taking into account the particular situation which has come about as a result of United States aggression in South-East Asia and the dangerous policy of the United States of America and other imperialist Powers in various regions of the world, the Soviet Union has submitted a number of proposals which are dictated by the requirements of the present international situation and aimed at diverting immediately the course of international events, from imperialist aggression and the escalation of military operations, towards a real reduction of international tension and then towards a durable peace.

Thus the Soviet Union has proposed reaching agreement immediately on the liquidation of all foreign military bases on the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from such territories. We have raised the question of withdrawing foreign troops from Vietnam, the island of Taiwan, the Congo, South Korea and Malaysia, and also, of course, from the territories of European States and from other areas of the world. We have proposed the liquidation, without any exception, of all military bases on the territories of other countries, which are springboards for aggression and hot beds of the danger of war. We have expressed ourselves in favour of achieving an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The delegation of the Soviet Union has also proposed (A/5827 and Corr.1) that, before the achievement of an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons, agreement should be reached among the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use such weapons.

In conditions where the threat of a thermo-nuclear war is becoming ever greater, and public officials of the United States are making statements about the possibility of using nuclear weapons in various situations and, consequently, in the war in Vietnam, the conclusion of such an agreement would have great significance and would make it possible to bring about the necessary conditions for taking further steps towards banning and destroying nuclear weapons.

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The Soviet delegation has resolutely advocated the achievement of an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in any form. Of course, the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can be resolved only on a basis of principle. In other words, an agreement on that subject must be a comprehensive one. It must not leave any loopholes for evasion.

We wish to stress very strongly once again that such an agreement must provide for an undertaking on the part of the nuclear Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons in any form, either directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, into the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing such weapons, and not to give non-nuclear States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. An agreement must provide also for a corresponding undertaking on the part of the non-nuclear countries. We have also expressed our readiness to meet the position of the United Arab Republic as stated on 17 August by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, who proposed that the scope of the Moscow Treaty should be extended to cover the prohibition of underground nuclear tests above a certain seismic magnitude and the establishment, as an additional measure, of a moratorium on any further nuclear tests pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive treaty (ENDC/PV.224, pp.9, 10). If the Western Powers were willing to respond to that proposal in a positive manner, we could, here and now, achieve practically the complete prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

The discussion that has taken place in the Committee has shown that the proposals of the Soviet Union meet with the support and understanding of all those who are genuinely interested in solving the questions of disarmament and the consolidation of peace. Those proposals have been supported here by the delegations of Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, which have also put forward some constructive and useful proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restricting the arms race.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee also had before it an important proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/151), the purpose of which was that the two German States should renounce the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons as well as obtaining control of them in any form; and that they agree on an arms stop. Moreover, the Government of the German Democratic Republic proposed that the two German States join a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

We note with satisfaction that the realization of the need for decisive actions in the field of disarmament that would really eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, and of the need to take measures which would put an end to the dangerous worsening of the international situation, has been reflected in the position of the non-aligned States members of the Committee. That realization is more or less evident both in the statements of the representatives of the non-aligned States and in their Joint Memoranda on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/158)<sup>\*</sup> and on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (ENDC/159)<sup>\*</sup>.

The non-aligned States have expressed in the Committee a good many useful ideas on a number of questions which we have been considering. Some of those ideas, as you already know, we have readily supported. With some others, unfortunately, it is not possible to agree. But some of them we should like to study closely. In summing up the positions of the socialist States, as well as the positions of the non-aligned countries, we are able to come to the conclusion that the majority of the members of the Committee have shown at this past session of the Committee a clearly-expressed willingness to seek agreement on those crucial questions of the present time which have inevitably been brought into the agenda of our work by the realities of the nuclear age, as well as on those problems the positive solution of which would at once considerably improve the international situation and facilitate further negotiations on disarmament.

As in the past, the Soviet Union is determined to exert every effort to achieve general and complete disarmament and, pending the solution of that main problem, to secure the adoption of measures to restrict the arms race and reduce international tension. We are convinced that the time will come when, through the united efforts of the peoples, the road to disarmament will be cleared and peace will reign on earth. The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union on all these problems are a good basis for effective agreements on these matters.

In conclusion, I should like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Dr. Protitch, his deputy Mr. Epstein, and all the members of the Secretariat, who by their efficient and conscientious efforts have enabled the Committee to carry on its day-to-day work.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I had hoped that this meeting, our last meeting, could end on a constructive note; and over the past two or three weeks it did seem to me that the Committee was devoting itself to the business before us. Today we have been treated to three more exhibitions of poisonous polemics which repeat the opening performance of the communist countries. I can only conclude that those countries have come here with two primary missions: first, to heap invective on my country in particular and the West in general; and, secondly, to see to it that the label "fruitless" be firmly attached to this Committee. I thoroughly disagree with both and I thoroughly disapprove of both.

The Soviet representative has again this morning returned to his tendentious political propaganda against the policies and the actions of my Government. I see no need to take the time of this Committee to refute these distortions, since there have been several occasions, I regret, on which I have had to do so at our earlier meetings. But let me say that, however useful Mr. Tsarapkin's statement regarding Vietnam and other areas of tension may be for his Government's propaganda mill, they do not accord with the facts as these are known to those with access to information about what is really going on in the parts of the world to which he referred. Nothing that he has said can in any way obscure the fact that aggression in Vietnam is directed and supported from the North. Our response there has been in direct proportion to that aggression and will cease when, as we strongly hope, tranquillity can be restored to South Vietnam by peaceful negotiations.

The orchestrated attempt by the communist nations to say that nothing has happened at this session is a tragedy, and the Soviet representative is apparently the leader of the band. I wonder whether he and his colleagues truly believe that this is the way to move the world in the direction of terminating the arms race and the threat of war. We simply cannot agree with him that our session has been fruitless. The remarks of Lord Chalfont were an excellent answer to this charge, and I support them fully. I do not believe that the Soviet views reflect the sentiment of most members here. (I will not presume, as did Mr. Tsarapkin, to attempt to speak for the non-aligned delegations as well as for his own colleagues.) In respect of this position, I may cite not only the relatively encouraging words included in our final report but also the statement made on 14 September by the representative of India. He said:

(Mr. Foster, United States)

"Although we made rather a slow beginning, it is extremely gratifying to note that, as our debate developed, we were able to make noteworthy progress in defining the issues, in pinpointing the differences, and in charting possible courses of action so that, when we reconvene, we can proceed forward from the positions we have already reached." (ENDC/PV.232, pp.12, 13)

I feel sure that most representatives here fully endorse that appraisal, and that does accord with the view of my own delegation.

In spite of the proper admonition by Lord Chalfont against "interpreting" and, in so doing, distorting statements of Western spokesmen and, as I said, even presuming to speak for the non-aligned delegations, the Soviet representative has now taken it upon himself to twist to his own design statements made by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Dean Rusk. I recommend to the other members of the Committee reliance on the original and not on this grotesque effort at reproduction. My Government's record in seeking to limit and reduce armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, needs no defence. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, while continuing to espouse sweeping measures and simple declarations, obstinately refuses to consider constructively the only practical and enforceable measures suggested to this Committee by my Government and others.

I can agree with my Soviet co-Chairman on one important item. As we are now preparing to go our separate ways, I wish to express the thanks of my delegation to the other members of this Committee for the constant co-operation and the many courtesies they have shown to me and my delegation. May I also express most sincerely my personal appreciation for the fine support given to our Committee by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Dr. Protitch, by his Deputy, Mr. Epstein, and by all the staff of the Secretariat? I also include in my thanks the verbatim reporters and, above all, the interpreters, who made the usual vital contribution to our work. Mr. Chairman, I should like to bid God-speed to you and to all our colleagues, and we look forward to a renewed association when we reconvene here as soon as possible after the disarmament debate at the General Assembly.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): In my turn I should like to say that I really do not understand why the representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union today, at this last meeting of ours, after the report has been adopted in a most amicable atmosphere, have wished to introduce polemical elements once again and have repeated ancient, ineffectacious and false accusations against Western policy. It would appear as if, choosing today specially to set off such an attack, the Eastern delegations are aiming at a specific target. Their statements have thus assumed the most unpleasant character of bad propaganda.

However, I do not wish to consider that this has disturbed or compromised the atmosphere which had been so happily established in this Committee during our last week of work. Today I wish to give predominance to other elements of a more constructive and less discouraging nature than the oratorical exhibitions of our Eastern colleagues to which we have had to listen. In point of fact, the statements made by them are in contradiction -- and I am very glad to point this out -- with what we have done up to now, with the words, the language and the substance of our report, and even with certain statements that the delegations of the Eastern countries have themselves made in the course of their speeches.

Those delegations have not denied the usefulness of the work that we have done here. The constructive character of our work has been recorded in a report which those delegations have approved, and it is on that note, on that basis, that I hope the Committee will adjourn today. This Committee adjourns with a very clear undertaking that we shall resume our work as soon as possible, and I think this is the most important fact, the fact that we must stress before we leave Geneva.

Before concluding, I should like to thank the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, for the interest he has shown in the proposal put forward by the Italian delegation on 14 September (ENDC/157). I wish to thank him for assuring me that the Canadian delegation will study our proposal in the most thorough and careful manner.

The delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia, which are also non-nuclear Powers, have not shown any interest in our proposal, and I should like to repeat that this proposal is addressed to all non-nuclear countries which are sincerely desirous of limiting without delay the danger of nuclear war. I hope that the Eastern delegations which have not spoken up to now will show by their actions their sincerity in regard to

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

the problem of non-proliferation. I hope that they will be so good as to study thoroughly the proposal, which is sincere and constructive, and that their response to our appeal will be in conformity with the views they have expressed on the importance and urgency of limiting the nuclear threat.

Before concluding, I should like to join those who have already expressed our warmest thanks to those who have helped us in our work, particularly the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): By a strange interplay of numbers and letters it has fallen to my delegation and to myself this year again, as was the case a year ago almost to the day, to adjourn the session of the Conference until it resumes its meetings early next year. Before doing so, however, may I just say a few words as Chairman of this last meeting?

I feel confident that I voice the sentiments of all members of the Committee when I express great respect and deep appreciation to our co-Chairmen for their contributions on our behalf, especially in preparing the fairly-worded and substantive report we have just adopted.

I also take it that all the members of the Committee will wish me to express our deeply-felt gratitude to Dr. Protitch and Mr. Epstein, as well as to the entire staff of the Secretariat, whose friendly co-operation and valuable assistance we have enjoyed once again.

I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to recall that midway through our session the members of the Committee received a gracious invitation from our colleague and friend, Mr. Cavalletti, on behalf of the Italian Government, to participate in a journey through northern Italy. We were profoundly grateful for that generous gesture, and I think that that unforgettable journey contributed to the good atmosphere that has reigned during this session.

It is of course to be deeply deplored that we have once more to announce failure to reach any agreement. Given the unfavourable circumstances of a deteriorating international situation, however, it is gratifying to note not only that we have kept on talking and probing into the differences barring our way to solutions and that we have done so in a spirit of dedication and seriousness, but also that we have been able to include in our report the fact that our extensive discussions and exchanges of views have contributed to facilitating agreement on the further work of this Committee.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

The sense of urgency that has marked this year's brief session, together with a wider basis for continued constructive negotiations that has emerged, entitle us, I believe, to part convinced that by continued and determined efforts workable solutions to the problem of limiting and halting the nuclear arms race could be achieved.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I do not know if it is usual to return thanks for thanks, but I should like to express to the members of the Committee the pleasure that we had in Italy in receiving them for a few days as our guests.

My delegation has been informed that you, Mr. Chairman, will probably be given a very important post elsewhere, and that today may be the last time you take part in our Conference. I should like therefore to express to you all my friendship and to offer you my good wishes for your success in your new functions.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I think Mr. Cavalletti for his kind words. May I assure the co-Chairmen and all the members of the Committee, present or absent, that I feel very deep gratitude for the courtesy and the understanding that all the members have shown to me and for the very close and friendly co-operation that I have had the great pleasure of having with you all while I have had the privilege of serving on this Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 234th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. P. Lind, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Nigeria, India, Italy, Poland, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Sweden (as Chairman).

"The Conference adopted a report<sup>1/</sup> on the Committee's deliberations for the period 27 July 1965 to 16 September 1965, to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on a date to be decided by the two co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee, as soon as possible after termination of the consideration of the question of disarmament at the twentieth session of the General Assembly."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.